THE JUDGMENT AND ITS IMPACT IN A NUTSHELL
In deciding the merits of Germany v. United States, 1 the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') for the first time intervened definitively, albeit partially, in domestic criminal proceedings. 2 The Court ruled that the Vienna executed pending the final decision in these proceedings […] ." 8 When Walter LaGrand was then executed anyway, 9 Germany proceeded with its case on the merits before the ICJ.
Germany presented three claims of rights and remedies under the Convention. It asked the Court to rule that the US failure to notify LaGrand of his consular rights violated the rights of both Germany and its national under Article 36.1 (submission 1). 10 It further claimed that by invoking the procedural default rule after failing timely to notify LaGrand of his consular rights, the US violated Article 36.2 (submission 2).
11 As reparation, Germany asked the ICJ to order the US to provide several assurances: not to repeat its violations, to ensure effective exercise of consular rights, and in the event of future violations involving the death penalty, to provide for effective judicial review and remedies for criminal convictions impaired by the violations (submission 4).
12
The US opposed most of Germany's claims. It also objected that Germany was in effect asking the ICJ to become an ultimate court of criminal appeals. Nonetheless the Court ruled:
1. Individual rights: The Convention confers rights on individuals to be notified of their right to communicate with their consulates. 2. Judicial remedies: Where individuals not so notified are then detained for a prolonged period, or convicted of crimes and sentenced to severe penalties, remedies are not limited to diplomatic apologies and undertakings, but must include domestic judicial remedies on behalf of individuals. By means of their own choosing, states must allow review and reconsideration of such convictions and sentences to take account of the violations. 14 3. Procedural defaults: Where a state fails in its duty to notify a detained foreign national of his right to consular communication, it may not later invoke procedural default to bar the individual from judicial relief.
15
The ICJ ruling thus rejects at least two grounds on which foreign nationals have sometimes been denied judicial relief in the US -the mistaken view that the Convention does not confer judicially enforceable indi-
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8. Order, 3 March 1999, supra note 4, at para. 29(I). 9. Judgment, para. 34. 10. Judgment, para. 12(1) . Submission 1 also asserted a violation of Art. 5 of the Convention, which the ICJ found unnecessary to address. Id., at paras. 12(1), 73. 11. Id., at para. 12(2). 12. Id., at para. 12(4). 13. Id., at paras. 77, 128(3) . 14. Id., at paras. 123, 125, 128; see note 59 infra. 15. Id., at paras. 91, 128(4) . vidual rights, 16 and the use of procedural default to bar late claims presented by individuals who were not timely notified of their consular rights. 17 However, its practical impact in the US will probably be quite limited, because it leaves open other grounds. Many US courts have denied relief on the ground that particular remedies or remedial theories, such as suppression of incriminating statements, 18 dismissal of indictments, 19 or relief from ineffective assistance of counsel, 20 are unavailable under the Convention. Others -or often the same courts, relying on multiple grounds -deny remedies unless violations are shown to prejudice the outcome of 72 International Remedies in National Cases 15 LJIL (2002) the trial, 21 an issue not clearly resolved by the ICJ ruling. 22 Even if US courts fully comply with the ICJ ruling, then, it may be that few foreign nationals will obtain judicial relief.
This potential lack of practical impact results not from undue timidity or lack of foresight by the ICJ, but from the limits of the case before it, which turned on procedural default. 23 The Court appropriately decided the questions necessary to resolve that case. Had it addressed issues raised by other cases, it would have been open to the charge of judicial overreaching.
Might future cases give the ICJ an opportunity to provide further clarification? Having now decided that the choice of appropriate judicial remedies must be left to states, the ICJ will not likely second guess US court rulings that particular remedies are unavailable to enforce the Convention in the US. Likewise, conscious of its limited role in domestic criminal cases, and assuming that it has not already done so, 24 the ICJ may be reluctant to delve into the question of whether or how judicial relief might be made to depend on a showing of prejudice. On the other hand, if it can be shown that no effective judicial remedy is available, or that domestic law tests for prejudice are so strict as to render illusory any real prospect of judicial remedy, the ICJ might well decide that its proper role of interpreting international law requires further intervention, in the event a case is brought before it. (See further discussion in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, infra.)
In addition to interpreting the Convention, the Judgment in Germany v. US makes significant ancillary rulings beyond the scope of this comment:
• Most important, it rules that ICJ orders of provisional measures are binding, 25 thereby settling a long-running dispute.
26
• It clarifies that where a treaty conferring individual rights has a general jurisdictional clause, the ICJ likewise has jurisdiction over state claims on behalf of nationals under the customary law of diplomatic protection.
27
• It confirms that where the ICJ has jurisdiction over a dispute, it also has jurisdiction over appropriate remedies.
28

ICJ RULING ON CONVENTION ISSUES
Individual right to notice of consular rights
Germany alleged a violation of its rights and those of its national to notice of consular rights. Article 36.1(b) of the Convention requires authorities detaining a foreign national to "inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph." Those rights include the right, if he so requests, to inform consular officials without delay of his detention, and the right to have any communication forwarded to the consulate without delay. 29 As consequence of the failure of notice, Germany further alleged violations of its rights to render consular assistance.
30
The US did not dispute its failure to notify LaGrand of his consular rights. 31 Nor did it contest jurisdiction over Germany's claim in its own right for violation of consular notice.
32
However, the US otherwise contested jurisdiction, admissibility and the merits. It objected to jurisdiction over Germany's claim for diplomatic protection of its national, as well as over the alleged violations of the right to render consular assistance. 33 It objected to admissibility, on the ground that LaGrand did not exhaust local remedies, because he did not raise the denial of notice of his consular rights at trial. Attributing that failure to his defense counsel, whose failure was in turn imputable to the client, the US argued that it could not be held accountable for errors by defense counsel. 34 It further objected to admissibility on the ground that Germany sought to impose a standard on the US that it does not itself meet.
35
On the merits, the US contested the violations of Germany's rights of consular assistance, 36 The Court rejected all these objections. The disputes over denial of consular assistance and individual rights gave the ICJ jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to the Convention. 38 The US could not rely on the defense lawyer's failure, "as it was the United States itself which had failed to carry out its obligation under the Convention to inform the LaGrand brothers." 39 Moreover, the evidence did not show that in cases of severe penalties Germany failed to meet its asserted standards.
40
On the merits, the Court found that since Germany did not learn of the detention until ten years later, the failure of notice also had the consequence of impairing its right to render consular assistance. 41 Further, the Court found that Article 36.1 "creates individual rights." 42 The clear language of the text sufficed to reach that conclusion: Article 36.1(b) mandates that a detained foreign national be notified of "his rights," and is followed by a proviso that consular assistance may not be rendered if the detainee "expressly opposes such action."
43 The Convention's plain meaning is to confer individual rights.
Procedural default rules
Germany argued that by applying domestic rules of procedural default after failing to notify LaGrand of his rights, the US violated its duty to Germany under Article 36.2 to give "full effect" to the purposes of Article 36 rights.
44
The US did not contest jurisdiction over the procedural default claim, but objected to its admissibility. Germany was asking the ICJ to review alleged errors of domestic law and judgment by US judges, and thereby The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
to convert itself into an "ultimate court of appeal in national criminal proceedings." 45 The Court answered, however, that it was asked "to do no more than apply the relevant rules of international law." 46 On the merits, the US argued that since the Convention "does not require States Party to create a national law remedy" for individuals, there could be no violation in defaulting this non-existent remedy.
47 National rules of criminal procedure were simply not covered by Article 36.2, meant to address only the timing and manner of consular communications and visits. 48 The Court answered that since Article 36.1 protects individual as well as state rights, the cross reference to these rights in Article 36.2 likewise covers the individual rights. 49 The problem in this case was not the procedural default rule per se, but its application to bar a claim that consular notice was not provided promptly, thus preventing the LaGrands from seeking and Germany from rendering consular assistance. 50 The procedural bar prevented US judges from "attaching any legal significance to the fact, inter alia," that the failure of notice "prevented Germany, in timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for them and otherwise assisting in their defense as provided for by the Convention." It thus prevented "full effect" from being given to the purposes of Article 36 rights. 
Judicial remedies for violations
Germany asked the Court to order the US to give three assurances: not to repeat its violations; to ensure effective exercise of consular rights; and to provide "effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions" impaired by any violations in death penalty cases.
52
The US objected to the Court's jurisdiction over assurances and guarantees, arguing that they are "conceptually distinct from reparation," unprecedented, and exceed the ICJ's remedial power. 53 The Court answered that it has jurisdiction to resolve a "dispute regarding the appropriate remedies" that arises out of interpretation or application of the Convention.
Where jurisdiction exists over a matter, no separate basis of jurisdiction is required to consider the appropriate remedies.
54
On the merits, the US repeated these objections, adding that it could not possibly meet Germany's demand that it "never again fail" to give notice. If the Court were to find a violation resulting from application of the procedural default rule, "it should limit that judgment to the particular case of the LaGrands" and not address future cases. 55 The Court found that no state could guarantee that it would never again fail to give notice, and that sufficient assurance of non-repetition was already provided by the "substantial measures" included in the "vast and detailed programme" undertaken by the US to inform and train law enforcement officers about consular rights.
56
On the other hand, the Court made clear that in this or any other case -including future cases -where foreign nationals are not timely notified of their consular rights and are "subjected to prolonged imprisonment or sentenced to severe penalties," diplomatic apologies are not sufficient.
57
In the event of a failure to give consular notice in a case involving a criminal conviction and sentence to severe penalties, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. ("While the act of clemency is, indeed, to be seen as part of the whole constitutional process of conviction, sentence and the carrying out of the sentence, it is an executive act and cannot be a substitute for the judicial determination of the appropriate sentence.") Of course, where a failure of consular notice taints only the punishment and not the underlying conviction, clemency could be a sufficient remedy.
LIKLELY IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES
The issues addressed by the ICJ have not yet been definitively confronted by the US Supreme Court, whose only opinions to date have been brief, hurried denials of requests for review and for stays. 60 They have been addressed by numerous lower courts in the US, 61 but without the benefit of guidance either from the Supreme Court or -until its recent Judgment -from the ICJ.
One might view this unsettled state of affairs as an open door for international law to enter into US domestic jurisprudence. 62 It may indeed prove to be a doctrinal portal. But for several reasons, the ICJ Judgment will likely have little direct, practical impact on the outcome of cases involving Convention violations in the US.
One reason is that two of its most important rulings -that the Convention confers individual rights, requiring judicial remedies in serious criminal cases -have already been effectively bypassed by most US courts. Although typically aware of the State Department claim that the Convention confers no justiciable individual rights, the lower US courts read the explicit language of individual rights in Article 36.1(b). They also read the Supreme Court's brief opinion in Breard, which denied relief on grounds of procedural default, but also acknowledged that the Convention "arguably confers on an individual the right to seek consular assistance following arrest. In consequence, most US courts hedge their bets. They "assume, without deciding" that the Convention creates individually enforceable rights, but "then hold that the requested remedy is inappropriate or the defendant did not prove he was prejudiced by the alleged Article 36 violation." 65 Moreover, as this suggests, most US courts rely on multiple grounds to deny relief, usually including one or more grounds not addressed by the ICJ. For example, noting that the ICJ did not address exclusion of evidence as a remedy, one recent federal court of appeals decision ruled that suppression of a statement given by the defendant is not an appropriate Judgment, the international and domestic litigation and public attention to consular rights appear to yield two other benefits. One is that compliance with the notice provisions of the Convention, while still seriously deficient, 72 has improved dramatically in recent years and may be further spurred by the ICJ Judgment. The improved effort by the State Department is discussed in the ICJ Judgment. 73 In addition, a number of state and local legislatures, courts, prosecutors and police departments have recently adopted laws, regulations and programs to promote compliance. 74 In a recent opinion, even while declining to rule on a Convention claim, one state Supreme Court nonetheless lectured the bar on consular rights, explaining:
We believe all criminal defense attorneys representing foreign nationals should be made aware of the right to consular access […] , and should advise their clients of this right […] . Consular officials can eliminate false understandings and prevent actions which may result in prejudice […] . Consular access may very well make a difference to a foreign national […] . […] The Court has ruled, and we have taken many steps since then and we're continuing to take more, because it is an extremely difficult matter, […] , in a country as big as ours, with as much law enforcement activity as ours, involving as many non-nationals as ours, to be sure that we're doing this right, but the commitment of the government is to abide by the Convention as interpreted by the Court.
In response to a follow-up question about the articulation of this position to US courts, he added, I'm not sure that there's been a court case where we've actually been asked for our view on that, but where we have been asked, we have advised […] states which have procedures, we've advised them of the opinion that the Court gave and recommended that they take it into account, and I believe they're doing that. lished only 167 opinions mentioning "international law"; in the same year they addressed consular rights under the Convention in some 50 cases. 76 Convention cases often involve extended analysis of international law and reach senior US judges on federal appellate courts and state Supreme Courts. 77 Following Germany v. US, consular rights litigation may well increase.
Ultimately consular rights cases may contribute to an improved international law culture in US courts. But there is not yet cause for exuberance; to date US courts have used whatever they might have learned about international law to reject nearly all claims based on the Convention. 
Choice of means
In requiring review and reconsideration of criminal convictions and sentences in cases of severe penalties, the ICJ left the choice of means to the US. This was consistent with the proper role of an international court, as well as an implicit response to the US rhetoric that any ruling on judicial remedies would transform the ICJ into a global court of criminal appeals.
While thus proper and prudent, leaving the choice of means to national authorities will mean further litigation. Numerous US lower courts have ruled that dismissing indictments, suppressing statements made by foreign nationals not advised of their consular rights, or finding ineffective assistance of counsel where defense lawyers fail to advise their clients of rights to assert claims based on Convention violations, are not appropriate remedies.
79 If these remedies are excluded, what is left? Arguably adequate remedies remain: reviewing courts could reverse convictions or sentences, and remand for either a new trial or a new hearing on the punishment. 80 But what if one or more of these remedies, too, are ruled inappropriate by US courts? Or what if US courts allow them, but set the bar so high for claimants -for example by requiring unrealistic showings of prejudice -that the remedies are effectively unavailable? In
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either event, will the US have given "full effect" to the purposes of consular rights, as required by Article 36.2? Should another case be brought before it, the ICJ may have to revisit the matter. Even allowing the US wide latitude in its choice of means, questions may nonetheless arise about particular means. For example, is a new trial an adequate remedy, or merely a pointless exercise, in a case where a confession secured in violation of consular rights remains the central proof of guilt? In some such cases, a new trial may be meaningful. It may afford an opportunity through consular assistance to introduce new evidence from the foreign national's home country, to overcome cultural barriers in his communications with his lawyer, or even to secure a more capable or wellfinanced attorney. But in other cases it may not. The adequacy of remedies may have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
What if police officers deliberately refrain from advising a detained foreign national of his consular rights, or deliberately delay his consular communication, until after they extract a confession? In case of such a wilful violation of consular rights, would the refusal by US courts to suppress the resulting statement give "full effect" to the purposes of consular rights? 81 If further cases are brought to The Hague (which will depend of course on decisions by governments, not by detained individuals or by the Court), the ICJ will need to strike a delicate balance. Remedial questions like these are similar to the judgment calls and policy questions faced daily by national courts enforcing domestic law rights. To intrude too deeply into them could indeed risk the ICJ's becoming an ultimate court of criminal appeals. On the other hand, for the ICJ to abstain entirely from review of the national choice of means risks allowing nullification of rights guaranteed by international law. In Germany v. US, the Court struck the balance well. The next case (if there is one) may be even more challenging.
International Remedies in National Cases
15 LJIL (2002) 
Prejudice
Germany argued that the violations of consular rights prejudiced the LaGrands. Timely consular assistance, it said, could have built a more effective case in mitigation which "likely would have saved" them. The US dismissed this contention as speculative, noting that comparable mitigation evidence was in fact heard.
82
Because the LaGrands had already been executed, however, this duel was apparently not over whether their convictions should be reversed -it was too late for that -but whether the denial of consular access violated their rights. The ICJ concluded:
It is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether the LaGrands would have sought consular assistance […] , whether Germany would have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these rights, and that Germany and the LaGrands were in effect prevented by the breach […] from exercising them, had they so chosen.
83
While this passage is not free from ambiguity, it appears to mean that prejudice need not be shown to establish a violation, while leaving open the question of whether prejudice must be shown to trigger judicial remedies.
84
US courts commonly answer this question in the affirmative. When they assume without deciding the availability of judicial remedies, they typically place the burden on the foreign national to show that if notified of his rights, he would have contacted his consul and, if so, the consul would have assisted him and, if so, the assistance would have changed the outcome. 85 As this author has argued previously, placing the burden on the individual (or anyone) to make such showings is unrealistic; if prejudice is relevant at all, the burden ought to be on the state to demonstrate that there was no credible likelihood of prejudice. 86 Since the ICJ Judgment
Douglass Cassel 83
82. Judgment, at para. 74 (emphasis added) . 84. The passage appears in the section of the Judgment on the merits of Germany's first submission -that the denial of notice violated consular rights. The ambiguity arises from the phrase, "for the purposes of the present case." The Court did not say only, "for the purposes of submission 1." And the "present case" also includes submission 4, which does request assurances of judicial remedies. However, since LaGrand was already executed and Germany did not request rehearing of his conviction or sentence, the "present case" raised no issue of conditioning his rehearing on a showing of prejudice. Moreover, the passage on prejudice is not repeated or referenced in the Court's subsequent discussion of remedies, which leaves the choice of means to national authorities. The passage thus appears to mean only that prejudice need not be shown in order to establish a violation. 85. See cases cited in supra note 21. 86. Cassel, supra note 1, at 882-884. The approach of the German Federal Court of Justice appears to be similar. It holds that it is "sufficient to show that it cannot be excluded that the decision of the court might have been different if the law had been applied properly." Verbatim Record before ICJ, CR 2000/29, argument of M. Kaul, para. 12.ii.
appears to abstain from this debate, however, there is little reason to expect US courts to reconsider their views.
If the right to consular notice were considered a fundamental or human right, both US and international law suggest grounds to argue that no showing of prejudice would be needed. In US law violations of fundamental rights may suffice to trigger judicial remedies with no showing of prejudice. 87 It may also be argued that in international law violations of fundamental human rights may per se require remedies. 88 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has held that at least in death penalty cases, consular rights are human rights. 89 Germany requested the ICJ to rule likewise that consular rights are human rights. The US responded that they are neither human rights nor fundamental, 90 to which Germany replied that human rights need not be natural rights, but can be based on positive law. 91 The Court found it unnecessary to reach the question. 92 If the issue of prejudice is presented in a future case, the ICJ may have cause to revisit this question.
Scope of application: severe penalties
Even while agreeing with the US that state obligations under the Convention do not depend on the gravity of the alleged crime, the ICJ added that "it does not follow therefrom that the remedies for a violation […] But what penalties are "severe"? Plainly they are not limited to the death penalty, since the Court also required judicial remedies for "prolonged detention." But how long must a detention be to qualify as "prolonged"? And how long a prison sentence amounts to a "severe" penalty? The ICJ Judgment treats imprisonment for two years as a "relatively light" penalty. 96 Beyond that, how many years amount to "severe" imprisonment, requiring judicial remedies? National courts are left to interpret these questions for themselves, at least until the ICJ next has occasion (if ever) to clarify.
ICJ INSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY
The Judgment in Germany v. US is important not only for criminal justice and consular rights, but also for the ICJ's institutional credibility. In this author's view, the Court got it right. On the one hand, it refused to be cowed by exaggerated objections that it was being asked to intrude into domestic judicial administration in sensitive criminal matters; it properly answered that it was merely doing its job of interpreting and applying international law. On the other hand, the Court went no further than justified by the facts of the case. It addressed the issues of individual rights and procedural default squarely raised by the case, without venturing into other issues not directly presented. It also got right the balance between national sovereignty and international supervision, ordering a remedy of resultdomestic review and reconsideration of convictions and sentenceswithout intruding into the choice of means by which a state might meet its international obligations (at least until some future showing that a state might have failed to provide any adequate means).
And the Court did all this following a fully adversarial and deliberate proceeding, 97 through an opinion attentive to the arguments advanced by The Judgment should thus serve to reinforce the Court's institutional credibility and effectiveness.
100
One aspect of the Judgment may be a two-edged sword. It requires judicial review of violations not only in capital cases like the LaGrand case, but also in other cases of "severe penalties." The Court thus distances itself from the politically explosive issue of capital punishment, while also muting any concern that it targets the US because of the frequent use of the death penalty in that country.
On the other hand, the practical result is to increase the Court's exposure to potential controversy with the far greater number of states that do not use the death penalty, but do impose other severe penalties. Still, the burden on states to provide consular notice is not a heavy one. And for every receiving state reluctant to allow judicial review, there is a home state of the foreign national, which may well be grateful that its national has access to judicial review. From the standpoint of the Court as an institution, the net balance appears positive.
For the "big picture" of human rights, the Judgment is also a small but significant advance. The ICJ is not yet (and may never be) in the business of reviewing how domestic criminal justice systems respect the internationally recognized rights of their own citizens. But it has taken a precursor step by reviewing how they respect the rights of foreign nationals. Moreover, it has done so in the case of a powerful country which otherwise has yet to accept any binding mechanism of international human rights supervision. Whether consular rights be considered human rights (as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled) or at least individual rights (as the ICJ has ruled), that is a welcome step forward for the international rule of law.
International Remedies in National Cases
15 LJIL (2002) 98. The Court's articulation of reasoning on some specific points is summary, bordering on conclusory. This can be understood, however, to reflect the need to produce an opinion which can be supported by a court of 15 judges from diverse legal systems and backgrounds, and to minimize needless disagreements over details that do not alter the outcome. Even so, the Court's reasoning is clear enough to enable a state party to know that its arguments have been considered, and whether they have been accepted or rejected, and why, as well as the basic reasons that underlie the Court's principal conclusions. From the perspective of common law lawyers, the Court's relative abstention from discussion of prior relevant cases is also frustrating. But this, too, is understandable, not only as a way to build convincing majorities on a large court, but more important, because many of the judges are not from common law systems. 99. Of the published votes in the case, one was unanimous, six were by 14-1, two by 13-2 and one by 12-3. Judgment, para. 128. 100. In dissent, Judge Oda wrote, I very much fear that the Court's acceptance of this Application presented unilaterally pursuant to the 'optional clause' will in future lead States that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, […] , to withdraw their acceptance […] .
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, para. 10. While only time will tell, this author does not share that opinion.
